Government Subsidies to Private Military R&D Investment: DOD's IR&D Policy by Frank R. Lichtenberg
NBER WORKINGPAPERSERIES
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES TO
PRIVATE MILITARY R&D INVESTMENT:
DOD S IR&D POLICY
Frank R. Lichtenberg
Working Paper No. 2745




Associate Professor, Colunhia University Graduate School of Business, and
Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research. This paper is part
of NBERs research programs in Productivity and Taxation. Any opinions
expressed are those of the author not those of the National Bureau of






A relatively obscure defense procurement policy establishes a large
subsidy to private military R&D investment. On the surface, it appears
that the marginal subsidy to suéh investment is zero, but this is only
true in the short run. Due to DOD's policy of allowable-cost determina-
tion, the long-run subsidy is substantial. It is much larger, in fact,
than the subsidy provided by the R&D Tax Credit enacted in 1981. I
calculate the subsidy by estimating an econometric model using
contractor-level data from the Defense Contract Audit Agency. This
subsidy may have an important influence on the amount and character of
privately financed innovation in the U.S.
Frank R. Lichtenberg
Graduate School of Business
Columbia University
726Uris hall
NewYork, NY 10027In a previous paper (1988) I argued that the Department of Defense
encourages its contractors to invest their ownfundsin defense—related
research and development (R&D) by sponsoring design competitions for the
award of major weapons contracts. I estimated the amount of private R&D
investment devoted to winning the "prizes" offered by the Pentagon, and
found it to be subatantialj
This paper seeks to show that the Defense Department encourages
private military R&D not only by establishing prizes, but also by subsi-
dizing expenditures dedicated towards winning the prizes. In other
words, DOD promotes this contractor activity both by creating returns to
it and by reducing the (private marginal) costs of it.
The Defense Department policy that provides a subsidy to private
military R&D is its policy regarding so-called "Independent" R&D.
Independent R&D is contractor-initiated and -directed technical effort•
that is not sponsored by, or required in performance of, a contract or
grant. The contractor selects the projects that comprise its IR&D
program. The Defense Department and its contractors consider indepen-
dent, or non-contract, R&D to be "company-funded" R&D, and it is reported
as such in financial statements and official government R&D statistics.
But under the Defense Procurement Regulations, some of the costs of
Independent R&D are "allowable," i.e. they can be included as indirect
costs (overhead) in contractors' Defense Department contracts. Each
year, ceilings on the amount of allowable Independent R&Dcostsare
negotiated in advance by the Defense Department and each of its major
11n a recent paper, Rogerson (1988) has estimated the value of the
prizes (economic profits) contained in aerospace contracts using an
event-study methodology.2
contractors. the existence of a subsidy to private military R&D is due
to the way in which these ceilings are negotiated or determined.
In this paper I will formulate a simple model of allowable IR&D cost
determination, and estimate the model using data for about 275 contrac—
tars compiled by the Defense Contrsct Audit Agency. These estimates
enable me to calculate the (long—run) marginal rate of subsidy to con-
tractor Independent R&D investment.
A major point of this paper is that, whereas the apparent marginal
rate of subsidy to independent R&D is zero, the true (long-nan) subsidy
is positive and substantial. The apparent subsidy is zero because
virtually all firms spend an amount in excess of the ceiling on allowable
costs previously negotiated with the Defense Department.2 Costs beyond
the ceiling cannot be recovered from the Pentagon. But the true marginal
subsidy is positive because the negotiated ceiling is an
increasing function of lagged expenditures. Thus a contractor whose
independent R&D costs already exceed his ceiling will not recover more
funds from DOD this year by increasing his expenditure, but he will
recover more in future years.
If IR&D policy does establish a subsidy for private military R&D
investment, it may have an important effect on the amount and character
of innovative activity in the U.S., and consequently on the nation's
economic performance. Since IR&D policy does not subsidize private
civilian R&D investment, it would lower the price to firms of sponsoring
military R&D relative to that of sponsoring civilian R&D, and therefore
21n 1986 aggregate (across all contractors) independent R&D costs
incurred was $5.0 billion, and aggregate allowable coats was $3.5
billion.3
increase the relative quantity of military R&D. If, moreover, the aggre-
gate supply of R&D inputs were aufficiently inelastic, the policy could
reduce the absolute (as well as relative) amount of civilian R&D. There
is abundant evidence that civilian R&D has a much larger impact on indus-
trial productivity and other performance measures than militaryR&D.3
The IR&D program may influence U.S. productivity growth by influencing
the amount and composition (military versus civilian) of induatrial R&D.
In Section I I describe DOD's IR&D policy and specify a model of
allowable-cost determination, which enables me to compute the (long-run)
marginal subsidy to private military R&D investment. In Section II I
briefly describe the data set and present the empirical results. Section
III contains concluding remarks.
I. A MODEL OF DOD's POLICY OF ALLOWABLE-COST DETERMINATION
To develop a model of DOD's policy of allowable-cost determination,
we adopt the following notation:
C =ceilingon allowable costa
X =totalcosta incurred
R =costsrecovered from OOD
S =totalsalea of the contractor
D =DODsales of the contractor
3See, for example, Criliches and Lichtenberg (1984), and Griliches
(1986).4
R, the amount of costs recovered from DOD, is determined by the following
formula
R = min(X,C)
Cost recovered is the fraction of firm sales accounted for by sales to
DOD times either Costa incurred or the ceilings, whichever is lower.
As Table I indicates, in practice, X C in the case of all firms.
The maximum value of the ratio C/X is 1; the mean and median values are
.823 and .872, respectively. Hence min(X,C) =C.Let us define 0 =D7S
as the DOD share of sales; we shall treat this fraction as a parameter.
Then equation (1) reduces to
R=B.C (2)
The private cost to the firm P of conducting a level of investment X is
PX- R
=x-ec (3)
The marginal rate of subsidy to contractor IR&D expenditure is
MR8_dR_e dC 4 dX
The marginal private cost of investment, which is generslly hypothesized
to determine the equilibrium rate of investment, is 1 —S.The margin-
al rate of subsidy, hence marginal private cost, depends on the deriva-
tive dC/dX. A primary objective of my empirical work is to determine the
value of this derivative.S
Table 1
Statistics Characterizing Distribution of C/X,







Note; These statistics are based on pooled data for 1985 and 1986. The
total number of observations is 598.6
The ceiling C is set in an agreement negotiated by the firm and DOD
_____tothe investment of funds- One might, therefore, regard C as
predetermined, i.e. independent of the realized expenditure X. In this
case, dC/dX =0and IR&D reimbursement has no effect on the marginal
private coat of investment; it reduces only total costs, like a lump-sum
payment. But the proposition that C does not depend on X, if it is true
at all, is probably only trud in the short run. Winston (1985, p. 22)
maintained that "the accepted ceilings are set at a fraction of the
contractor's anticipated tRW expenditures that are deemed to meet the
Pt-fR criterion and to be of value of DOD." This hypothesis can be repre-
sented as follows;
=Y
where C denotes the ceiling negotiated for period t and denotes
anticipated expenditure during the period. Suppose 4isforecast by a
distributed lag function of past actual expenditures, with geometrically
declining lag coefficients;
4= 6(X_÷ ?(t_2÷




It is well known (see, e.g., Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981, pp. 232-3))
that eq. (7) can be rewritten in the more empirically tractable auto-
regressive form
C = +7
wherea y'6. In this model there is a distinction between the
short-run and long-run derivatives of C with respect to X; these are
and I(l -N),respectively.
It is interesting to note that an alternative "structuralt' model for
determining C can generate a similar (although restricted) reduced—form
equation. Suppose that the change in a firm's negotiated ceiling is
proportional to the degree of "excess demand" for IR&D funds, as measured





Adding Ct1 to both sides,
C = + (1-
B)C_1 (10)
In eq. (10) the coefficients on X_1 and Ct_I sum to 1, whereas this is
not the case in eq. (8). This restriction can be tested by estimating
both equations.
Below I report estimates of these equations based on cross—sectional
data for about 275 IR&D sponsoring organizations. To attenuate
heteroskedasticity and for other reasons, I estimate logarithmic versions
of the equations, i.e., C and X are defined as logarithms of the respec-
tive variables. In this caseand b/(l -N)are respectively the short-
and long-run elasticities of C with respect to X. The long-run
tive of C with respect to X is
4fleppy (1977, p. 399) noted that "the size of the negotiated ceiling
is in general a function of the previous year's ceiling, modified by any
changes in expected sales base or sales mix."S
-p (11) dXl-? X
and the long-run marginal rate of subsidy is (from eq. (4))
MRS .c 2 LRS 1-A X (1)
This expression is evaluated at the aample aggregate values of D, S, C,
and X to obtain an "average" estimate of the long-run marginal rate of
subsidy -
II.DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The data for this investigation are derived from Detailed
tical Reports on IR&DIB&P Costs Incurred y Major Contractors for 1985-56
compiled by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).5 The DCAA report
contains data on expenditures, ceilings, and reimbursements pertaining to
another type of technical effort related to IR&D: the preparation of
bids and proposals (B&P). Because the reasoning which led to the speci-
fication of eqs. (8) and (13) applies as well to B&P as it does to IR&D
expenditure, these equations are estimated for both IR&D and B&P expendi-
ture. The disturbances of the IR&D and B&P equations are likely to be
correlated, in part because there is some fungibility of expenditures
between the two categories. We can therefore obtain more efficient
parameter estimates by estimating the IR&D and B&P equationa jointly,
using Zeilner's seemingly unrelated regresaions (joint generalized least
am grateful to Colonel Robert Guatin of the Defense Contract
Audit Agency for providing me with these data.9
squares) technique.In. this context we can also test the hypothesis that
the parameters of equation (8), hence MRSaI are the same for B&P as they
are for IR&D.
Joint generalized least squares estimates for IR&D snd B&P of
equation (8) are presented in the first two columns of Table 2. I also
report point estimates and standard errors of the nonlinear function of
the parameters /(l -X),since this expression is needed to compute the
long—run marginal subsidy. (The standard errors were computed by esti-
mating the model using a nonlinear regresaion procedure.) In both
equations, the parameter(the coefficient on X_1) is positive and
significantly different from zero. The hypothesis that +X=1,which
is implied by the model (9), is decisively rejected in the case of IR&D
but is not rejected Cat the .10 level) in the case of B&P. The cross-
model residual correlation is -.093, suggesting that there is some
substitution between IR&D and B&P ceilings and/or expenditure. In the
third column of Table 2 I report estimates of the model on which the
restriction is imposed that the parametersand A are identical across
equations. The P—statistic (prob. value) for testing this restriction is
1.68 (.187), so I am unable to reject this restriction.
table 3 presents calculations of the average and (long—run) marginal
rates of subsidy separately for IR&D and B&P and for the two categories
pooled. The long-run marginal subsidy to IR&.D alone is 36.9 percent,
slightly less than (but not significantly different from) the average
subsidy of 43.4 percent. The marginal and average subsidies to B&P
expense are somewhat higher: 45.7 and 55.6 percent, respectively.10
Table 2
Joint GLS Estimates of eq. (8) for
IR&D and B&P expenditures
(1) (2) I (3)
IR&D B&P I Restricted
Parameter or function
(standard error) I
.202 .297 I .246
(.096) (.078) I (.059)
.731 -675 I
(.100) (.078) I
.750 .909 I .834





for testing (.000) (.104)
weighted .9289 I .9284




In the case of B&P, the difference between the estimated marginal and
average subsidy rates is significant. Since we were unable to reject the
hypothesis of equality of the [R&D and B&P coefficients, the pooled
results perhaps deserve the greatest emphasis. These imply that the
government pays 41.3 percent of the marginal cost of IR&D and B&P ex-
pense. This is slightly (although significantly) less than the average
subsidy rate of 47.4 percent.
The rates of subsidy were computed using data for 1985-86; it is
natural to ask whether similar rates applied in the past. Data presented
by Winston (1985, p. 67) reveal that the average subsidy for IR&D and B&P
combined during the period 1974-84 ranged between 41.4 and 48.0 percent,
with little discernible trend. But Hill and Bodilly (1988) assert that
IR&D cost "recovery is now less tightly tied to the firm's expenditure"
than it was in the past, implying that the marginal subsidy rate has
declined.
The marginal rates of subsidy to IR&D and SW appear to be quite
high. The R&D Tax Credit created by the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act
provides a bencbmark against which we can compare this subsidy. The
provisions of the credit allowed firms to deduct from their tax liability
an amount equal to 25 percent of their R&D spending above a certain
base-period amount. But due to certain technical festures of the creait
--particularlythe way in which the bsse-period amount was cslculated --
theeffective rate of subsidy it provided was much lower than 25 percent;
Baily and Chakrabarti (1988, p. 119) estimate that the effective rate of
subsidy was 7 to 8 percent. Moreover, the credit was only temporary --
itwas originally due to expire at the end of 1985 after 4-kyears.In
contrast, DOD's IR&D policy has remained essentially unchanged since
1970, and predecessor policies can be traced back to the l930s.12
Table3
Calculation of Marginal and Average Subsidies
to IR&D andB&P Expenditure
margina' t-statistic
1986 Samplea subsidy averageto test H0;
aggregate values_LED XC subsidy marginal
LX XC ZR1-A ES1-A XXZR/fl averag
IR&D 497135152159.750 .369 .434 1.41
(.046)
B&P 24151749 1343 .909 .457 .556 3.81
(.026)
pooled 738652643502 .834 .413 .474 2.65
(.023)
Notes: a. millions of dollars
b. standard error in parentheses.
ED/ES =113.8b./l63.8 b. .69513
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The evidence presented in this paper is consistent with the hypothe-
sis that the Defense Department, via its independent R&D policy, provides
a substantial implicit subsidy --onthe order of 40 percent --to
private military R&D investment. Contractors spend above their ceilings
on allowable costs, so it appears on the surface that the marginal
subsidy ia zero. This appearance is misleading because in the long run,
negotiated ceilings respond positively to lagged expenditures.
While our estimates reveal the magnitude of the subsidy to private
military R&D, they do not reveal how much (additional) R&D is undertaken
due to the existence of the subsidy. To determine this with any preci-
sion, we would need to know the price-elasticity of supply of R&D, a
parameter about which little is known. But the existence of the subsidy
is no doubt partly responsible for the fact (established in my earlier
paper) that the marginal private R&D intensity of government (primarily
defense) sales is much higher than the R&D intensity of nongovernment
sales ——9.3percent as opposed to 1.7 percent.
The main point of this paper is that the government encourages
private defense-related R&D investment by providing an implicit subsidy
to. this activity as well as by establishing rewards or prizes for per-
forming it. We conclude by briefly considering two questions about the
"logic" of this policy.
First, why does the government provide a subsidy for private mili-
tary R&D, in addition to establishing prizes for innovation? Presumably
if the subsidy were abolished the government could continue to induce the
same amount of private R&D investment by increasing the value of the
prizes. The answer may be that the cost to the goverpment of promoting agiven level of investment may be lower with a combination of prizes and
subsidies than it would be with prizes alone. By providing a subsidy the
government in effect shares with the contractor the risk of investment;
the agency theory literature suggests that such risk-sharing is often
optimal from the principal's (government's) point of view.
The second question is, given that the government wanta to provide a
subsidy, why doesn't it do so explicitly by announcing "we'll pay 40
percent of your independent R&D expense, with no ceiling," rather than by
imposing ceilings that are in reality influenced by past expenditures? It
is not possible to offer a definitive answer to this question, but two
factors may account for the institutional arrangements we have described.
First, while the major objective of independent R&D policy is to
strengthen the defense technology base by promoting private military R&D
investment, for political reasons the Defense Department may need to at
least appear to be "controlling costs" by imposing ceilings.6 Second,
the government is interested not only in encouraging private innovation
but also in transferring technologies and knowledge developed in the
course of independent R&D to government officials. The negotiation of
ceilings provides the government with the opportunity to monitor contrac-
tor activity, thereby facilitating technology transfer.
6Alexander (1988, p. 35) notes that there are two offices within the
office of the Secretary of Defense involved with independent R&D policy:
The Deputy Undersecretary for Research and Advanced Technology, whose
primary concern is the promotion of technology and the encouragement of
industry R&D, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Procurement, whose
primary concern is reducing the cost of acquisition.15
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